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n the 1970s, commercial banks in the United
States faced restrictions on interest rates, both
on the deposit and lending sides of their busi-
ness. They were restricted for the most part to
classic financial intermediation—deposit-taking
and lending—to the exclusion, for example, of
underwriting many corporate securities and insur-
ance products. And banks were limited in the
geographical scope of their operations. No state
permitted banks headquartered in other states either
to open branches or to buy their banks, and many
states prohibited or restricted intrastate branching. 
Today, almost all of these restrictions have been
lifted: Interest rate ceilings on deposits were phased
out in the early 1980s; state usury laws have been
weakened because banks may now lend anywhere;
and limits to banks’ ability to engage in other finan-
cial activities have been almost completely elimi-
nated, as have restrictions on the geographical scope
of banking. As a result, our banking system is now
more competitive and more consolidated than ever—
both vertically and horizontally.
This paper focuses on how one dimension of
this broad-based deregulation—the removal of limits
on bank entry and expansion—affected economic
performance. In a nutshell, the results suggest that
this regulatory change was followed by better per-
formance of the real economy. State economies grew
faster and had higher rates of new business forma-
tion after this deregulation. At the same time, macro-
economic stability improved. By opening up markets
and allowing the banking system to integrate across
the nation, deregulation made local economies
less sensitive to the fortunes of their local banks.
First, I explain how relaxation of geographical
restrictions on bank expansion proceeded histori-
cally and why our somewhat unusual history of
state-level regulation and deregulation presents an
attractive setting to study how the financial system
affects the real economy. I then present evidence
that banking deregulation led to substantial and
beneficial real effects on our economy. The findings
are important for at least two reasons. First, they
demonstrate the tight link between “Wall Street”
and “Main Street.” Finance is not only affected by
the fortunes of the industrial sector, but the reverse
holds true as well. This mutual dependence high-
lights the importance of financial regulation not only
here in the United States but, perhaps even more
critically, in emerging economies without a well-
developed set of financial markets and institutions.
Second, the results support the idea that competition
and openness in financial markets are beneficial.
This finding is accepted when applied to industrial
firms—for most economists, free trade and compe-
tition are akin to motherhood—but it is much less
accepted when applied to the financial sector.
BANK DEREGULATION AS AN
EMPIRICAL LABORATORY
The evolutionary history of banking regulations
in the United States offers researchers a unique
opportunity to study the effects of deregulation,
particularly those related to restrictions on banks’
ability to expand within and across state lines,
because regulations were imposed at the state level
and because states changed their regulatory restric-
tions on expansion at different times. Although there
was some deregulation of branching restrictions in
the 1930s, most states continued to enforce these
policies into the 1970s. In 1970, only 12 states
allowed unrestricted statewide branching. Between
1970 and 1994, however, 38 states deregulated their
restrictions on branching.1
In addition to branching limitations within a
state, until the 1980s states effectively prohibited
cross-state ownership of banks by applying the
Douglas Amendment to the 1956 Bank Holding
Company (BHC) Act. This amendment prohibited a
BHC from acquiring banks outside the state where
1 Although branching was generally restricted, banking companies
could expand in some states by forming multi-bank holding companies.
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© 2003, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.it was headquartered unless the target bank’s state
permitted such acquisitions. Since states chose to
bar such transactions, the amendment effectively
prevented interstate banking. Change began in 1978,
when Maine passed a law allowing entry by out-of-
state BHCs if, in return, banks from Maine were
allowed to enter those states. (Entry in the case
means the ability to buy incumbent banks.) No state
reciprocated, however, so the deregulation process
remained stalled until 1982, when Alaska and New
York passed laws similar to Maine’s. State deregula-
tion was nearly complete by 1992, by which time
all states but Hawaii had passed similar laws.
Table 1 notes the years each state relaxed these
restrictions on bank branching and interstate bank-
ing. The first column presents the year in which
each state permitted branching by means of merger
and acquisition (M&A) only. With this form of dereg-
ulation, an expansion-minded bank could enter a
new market, either by buying an existing bank in
that market and folding its operations into the
acquirer’s existing operations or by buying individual
branches of existing banks. The second column
reports the year in which each state first permitted
unrestricted branching, thereby allowing banks to
enter new markets by opening new branches. In
most cases, branching by M&A occurred first, then
unrestricted branching deregulation occurred soon
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Year of State-Level Deregulation of Restrictions on Geographical Expansion
Intrastate branching  Unrestricted intrastate  Interstate banking 
State  via M&A  branching permitted  permitted  
Alabama 1981  1990  1987   
Alaska <1970  <1970  1982   
Arizona <1970  <1970  1986   
Arkansas 1994  *  1989   
California <1970  <1970  1987   
Colorado 1991  *  1988   
Connecticut 1980  1988  1983   
Delaware <1970  <1970  1988   
Washington, DC  <1970  <1970  1985  
Florida 1988  1988  1985   
Georgia 1983  *  1985   
Hawaii 1986  1986  *   
Idaho <1970  <1970  1985   
Illinois 1988  1993  1986   
Indiana 1989  1991  1986   
Iowa *  *  1991   
Kansas 1987  1990  1992   
Kentucky 1990  *  1984   
Louisiana 1988  1988  1987   
Maine 1975  1975  1978   
Maryland <1970  <1970  1985   
Massachusetts 1984  1984  1983   
Michigan 1987  1988  1986   
Minnesota 1993  *  1986   
Mississippi 1986  1989  1988   
Missouri 1990  1990  1986   
Table 1thereafter. Because these changes usually occurred
in quick succession, it is hard to isolate the impact
of M&A branching from the impact of permitting
new branches; moreover, it turns out that most banks
enter new markets by buying existing banks or
branches rather than by building new ones. So, in
the empirical analysis I construct a single branching
indicator based on the date a state first permitted
branching by M&A.
The third column reports the year in which states
first entered into an interstate banking agreement
with other states. With interstate deregulation, it
became possible for an outside banking organiza-
tion to acquire a state’s incumbent banks. This form
of deregulation, however, did not permit these
newly acquired banking assets to be folded into the
acquirer’s banking operations outside the state. State-
level progress toward interstate banking, therefore,
did not lead to interstate branching. In 1994, though,
the deregulatory process was completed with passage
of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act of 1994 (IBBEA), federal legislation that mandated
complete interstate banking as of 1997 and encour-
aged states to permit interstate branching. IBBEA
permitted states to opt out of interstate branching,
but only Texas and Montana chose to do so. Most
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Year of State-Level Deregulation of Restrictions on Geographical Expansion
Intrastate branching  Unrestricted intrastate  Interstate banking 
State  via M&A  branching permitted  permitted  
Montana 1990  *  1993   
Nebraska 1985  *  1990   
Nevada <1970  <1970  1985   
New Hampshire  1987  1987  1987  
New Jersey  1977  *  1986  
New Mexico  1991  1991  1989  
New York  1976  1976  1982  
North Carolina  <1970  <1970  1985  
North Dakota  1987  *  1991  
Ohio 1979  1989  1985   
Oklahoma 1988  *  1987   
Oregon 1985  1985  1986   
Pennsylvania 1982  1990  1986   
Rhode Island  <1970  <1970  1984  
South Carolina  <1970  <1970  1986  
South Dakota  <1970  <1970  1988  
Tennessee 1985  1990  1985   
Texas 1988 1988 1987   
Utah 1981  1981  1984   
Vermont 1970  1970  1988   
Virginia 1978  1987  1985   
Washington 1985  1985  1987   
West Virginia  1987  1987  1988  
Wisconsin 1990  1990  1987   
Wyoming 1988  *  1987
NOTE: *States not yet fully deregulated by 1996. M&A is merger and acquisition.
SOURCE: Amel (1993) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999).
Table 1 cont’dother states protected their banks by forcing out-of-
state entrants to buy existing branches rather than
open new ones.
The staggered timing of state-level action to
deregulate both branching and interstate banking
restrictions provides an ideal laboratory to explore
empirically how these regulatory changes affected
banking and the real economy. Because of the cross-
state and over-time variation in the regulatory status
of different states, both unobserved state differences
and aggregate shocks (and any trends) can be fully
absorbed with the inclusion of fixed effects, while
leaving sufficient variation in the regulatory variables
to estimate their effects on state-level financial and
real variables. Moreover, by using the state as the
relevant unit, the resulting panel data set is balanced
because states do not enter or exit the sample. Thus,
there is no need to worry about (or attempt to correct
for) survivorship biases that can plague attempts to
draw inferences from bank-level or firm-level data.2
To be concrete, the research method boils down
to estimating a regression using observations from




where s indexes states, t indexes time, yst is the
dependent variable of interest, αt is a year-specific
fixed effect (estimated by including year indicator
variables), βs is a state-specific fixed effect (estimated
by including state indicator variables), Branchst is
an indicator set to 1 after a state permits branching
(by means of M&A), and Bankst is an indicator set to
1 after a state permits interstate banking. Thus, the
deregulation indicators equal 1 in all state-years
following deregulation, and they equal 0 in all state-
years prior to deregulation.3
Endogenous Deregulation?
Before describing the results, it is worth consider-
ing briefly why banking regulations remained static
from the 1930s to the mid-1970s and why they
began to change across all states from the 1970s
to the early 1990s. Several developments probably
contributed. In the mid-1980s, for instance, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency took
advantage of a clause in the 1864 National Bank Act
to allow nationally chartered banks to branch freely
in those states where savings institutions (savings
and loans and savings banks) did not face branching
restrictions. The Comptroller’s action was instru-
mental in introducing statewide branching in several
southern states. Another impetus behind deregu-
lation may have been the rash of bank and thrift
failures in the 1980s, which increased public aware-
ness of the advantages of large, well-diversified
banks. As part of the 1982 Garn–St. Germain Act,
for example, federal legislators amended the Bank
Holding Company Act to allow failed banks and
thrifts to be acquired by any BHC, regardless of state
laws (Kane, 1996).
More broadly, Economides, Hubbard, and Palia
(1996) show that small banks lobbied successfully
in the 1930s for both generous deposit insurance
and tight limits on branching, despite the objections
of large banks. White (1998) shows that the small
bank lobby continued its success over the subse-
quent 40 years by gaining increased levels of deposit
insurance coverage all the way up until 1980, when
this limit was last raised (to $100,000).4 Thus, the
influence of small banks may explain the relative
stability of these regulatory institutions from the
1930s through the 1970s.
Kroszner and Strahan (1999) suggest that the
emergence of new technologies in both deposit-
taking and lending that began in the 1970s tipped
the balance in the political arena from the traditional
beneficiaries of geographical restrictions—small
banks—toward more expansion-minded large banks.
As evidence, we show that deregulation occurred
earlier in states (i) with fewer small banks, (ii) where
small banks were financially weak, and (iii) with
more small and bank-dependent firms. We also find
that where the insurance industry was large, dereg-
ulation tended to occur later, particularly when banks
could compete in the sale of insurance products.
The relative strength of potential winners (large
banks and small firms) and losers (small banks and
the rival insurance firms) from deregulation can
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4 As of this writing, an increase in FDIC insurance coverage to $130,000
is under debate in Congress at the urging of advocacy groups repre-
senting the interests of small, community banks.
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2 These issues are especially important for studies of entry regulations
because the competitive shakeout that occurs after regulatory change
increases the odds that some banks will not survive.
3 I drop observations during the year of deregulation. In addition, I do
not include Delaware and South Dakota in any of the analyses because
these states had a unique history due to the growth of the credit card
business there.therefore explain the timing of branching reform
across states.5
Given these political economy explanations for
banking reform, can we interpret the results from
equation (1)? The results in Kroszner and Strahan
(1999) suggest that aggregate forces such as techno-
logical change affected all financial services firms
and created increasingly strong pressures for regula-
tory regime change; however, interest group factors
determined the exact timing of when a particular
state changed its laws. Thus, a cross-state compari-
son of state growth or business cycle volatility might
be misleading, or at least difficult to interpret. For
example, consider comparing states in a single year,
say, 1987. If states permitting interstate banking had
more large banks than states that did not yet permit
interstate banking, it could be that regulation led to
structural changes favoring large banks (i.e., regula-
tion caused the structural change). Or it could be
that states with more large banks deregulated before
states with fewer large banks (i.e., regulation was
caused by the cross-state differences in structure).
The estimators reported here are not likely to
be affected by the political economy factors. By
including the state fixed effects (βs) in the model,
all of the cross-sectional variation (such as when a
state deregulates) gets removed; coefficients are
driven by changes in variables after a state alters its
regulations. Persistent differences across states
(e.g., those dominated by large vs. small banks) do
not affect the results. Instead, we look at how a state’s
banking structure changes after it deregulates; how
its growth performance changes relative to its level
before deregulation; and how the volatility of its
business cycle changes, again, relative to its volatility
prior to regulatory change.
HOW BANKING CHANGED AFTER
DEREGULATION
We can expect deregulation to have had large
effects on the real economy only if there were
important changes in the structure and efficiency
of the banking industry resulting from the reforms.
Briefly, the key changes are as follows: Relaxing
restrictions on bank expansion led to larger banks
operating across a wider geographical area. Increases
in local market concentration, however, did not
occur. This makes sense because the restrictions
on branching and interstate banking generally did
not apply to local markets, with the exception of a
few unit banking states that did not permit branching
in any form. Thus, deregulation led banks to enter
new markets, but it did not spur banks to consolidate
within a local market.6
Table 2 documents very briefly the magnitude
of some of these changes, including the estimated
coefficients on the intrastate branching indicator
(Branchst) and the interstate banking indicator
(Bankst) from the fixed-effects model described in
equation (1). In column 1, the dependent variable
equals the acquisition rate in a state-year (defined
as the total dollar value of assets in banks acquired
in a state-year, divided by total banking assets in
the state at the beginning of the year).7 The results
suggest, as expected, that acquisitions increased
sharply following interstate banking deregulation.
The coefficient implies that the annual acquisition
rate rose by 1.64 percentage points after interstate
reform—quite a large jump relative to the uncondi-
tional mean of 2.77 percent. In contrast, there was
no significant increase in bank acquisitions follow-
ing branching deregulation. Banks tended to expand
by purchasing branches of existing banks rather
than by acquiring all of the branches and other
assets of whole banks, so the acquisition rate of
whole banks did not rise. (For details, see Stiroh
and Strahan, forthcoming.)
The second column of Table 2 shows that local
market concentration did not increase following
deregulation despite the increased acquisition activ-
ity; if anything, there was a slight drop following
interstate banking reform.8 Local market concen-
tration equals the deposit Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), calculated as the deposit-weighted
average of the HHIs of the metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs) in a state-year. The HHI for each local
market is defined as the sum of squared market
shares, where market shares are based on branch-
level deposit data from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation’s Summary of Deposits data set. To illus-
trate how this variable is computed, consider a bank
(or banking company) that owned 10 branches
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5 We also find that the same interest group variables also can explain
the voting patterns of legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives
on interstate banking deregulation and deposit insurance reform.
(See Kroszner and Strahan, 2001.)
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6 For a comprehensive survey of the literature on financial consolidation,
see Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999).
7 An “acquisition” here occurs when ownership of banking assets
changes. So, if a BHC buys a bank, or if two unaffiliated banks merge,
both would contribute to total assets in acquisitions. But if two banks
owned by the same holding company merged, these assets would
not be counted.
8 Concentration at the state and national levels has increased substan-
tially, however, in part because of these regulatory changes.within an MSA. This bank’s market share (measured
in percentage terms) would equal the sum of all of
its deposits in those 10 branches, divided by the
total deposits held by all bank branches within that
MSA, multiplied by 100. For a market with a single
bank owning all of the branches, the HHI would
equal 10,000, whereas in a perfectly atomistic market
the HHI would approach 0.
The last three columns of Table 2 show that the
market share of small banks declined following
both branching and interstate banking reform. The
declines were most pronounced following branching
deregulation. For example, the share of assets held
by banks with less than $50 million in assets (in
1994 dollars) fell by 1.6 percentage points (relative
to a mean of 8.9 percent), the share of assets held
by banks with assets of $50 to $100 million fell by
2.0 percentage points (relative to a mean of 10.3
percent), and the share held by banks with assets
of $100 to $500 million fell by 2.2 percentage points
(relative to a mean of 23.2 percent). After interstate
banking the share of the smallest banks declined
while the share of other banks did not change 
significantly.
Did these structural changes cause meaningful
changes in the efficiency of a state’s banking indus-
try? In earlier research, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998)
report that the banking industry became significantly
moreefficient following reform. They find that non-
interest costs fell, wages fell, and loan losses fell
after states deregulated branching. These cost reduc-
tions led, in turn, to lower prices on loans (although
not on deposits). The mechanism for this better
performance seems to be changes in the market
shares of banks following deregulation. Prior to
regulatory reform, well-run banks faced binding
constraints on the markets in which they could
operate. When these constraints were lifted, however,
assets moved toward the better-run banks as they
gained the opportunity to acquire market share.9
The beneficial dynamic effects of competition
following deregulation can be seen graphically in
Figures 1 through 3.10 Figure 1 simply plots the
correlation between a bank’s profit rate (return on
equity [ROE]) and its subsequent asset growth. We
find that this correlation is low during the late 1970s,
when the better banks were constrained by regula-
tions, then rose sharply during the period of regula-
tory change—the period when better banks were
gobbling up market share—and fell back during
the 1990s. The figure illustrates, somewhat crudely,
the dynamic effects of deregulation.
Figures 2 and 3 show the outcome of these
dynamics by plotting the average market share of
banks with above-median profits, averaged across
states, after first separating them into three groups:
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Structural Changes in the Banking Industry Following Deregulation (1994 dollars)
Share of assets in banks with assets
Local  Less than  $50 to  $100 to 
Acquisition rate deposit HHI  $50 million  $100 million  $500 million  
Post-branching 0.0031 –9.85  –0.016* –0.020* –0.022*
(0.0062) (34.34) (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.006)   
Post-interstate banking  0.0164* –76.87* –0.013* –0.005 0.004
(0.0078) (43.13) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.007)   
N 849 824 849 849 849
Within R
2 0.1229 0.0290 0.4644 0.3888 0.1707
Dependent-variable mean  0.0277  1,913  0.089  0.103  0.232
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. The acquisition rate is the dollar value of assets acquired during the state-year divided by
beginning-of-period assets in the state-year. The local deposit HHI is the sum of squared market shares for all banking organizations
operating within a local market, defined as an MSA. For states with multiple MSAs, we average the HHI across MSAs within the state,
weighted by the amount of deposits in the MSA. The model is estimated using a fixed-effects model with both year and state effects.
The year of deregulation is dropped. Also, South Dakota and Delaware are dropped. *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 2
9 Hubbard and Palia (1995) also show that management compensation
became more sensitive to performance after deregulation.
10 These figures are taken from Stiroh and Strahan (forthcoming).(i) states that have permitted branching since the
1930s or before (12 states); (ii) states that limited
branching (23 states); and (iii) the unit banking states
that did not permit any form of branching (16 states).
The figures illustrate the detrimental effects of these
constraining regulations. For example, in unit bank-
ing states, the higher-profit banks typically held 50
percent or less of the assets in a state; after those
states relaxed their regulations, however, these better
banks’ share rose to 65 to 75 percent of the state’s
assets. States that limited but did not prohibit branch-
ing experienced qualitatively similar effects following
deregulation, although these effects were somewhat
smaller.
THE REAL EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION
Did the beneficial changes in banking have
quantitatively important effects on the real economy?
The answer to this question is important not only
for helping us gain an understanding of what has
happened in the United States, but also for consider-
ing how banking systems across the world ought to
be structured and regulated. In recent years, a grow-
ing number of researchers have studied how differ-
ent financial regulatory regimes across countries
affected financial stability and economic perfor-
mance. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) test how differences
in financial development and banking structure
affected growth across different industries. Demirgüç-
Kunt, Levine, and Min (1998) find that banks perform
better in countries that are open to foreign entry.
Most recently, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2002)
document how various dimensions of banking laws
and regulations—e.g., restrictions on bank activities,
restrictions on entry, capital adequacy regulations,
deposit insurance, supervision and regulation of
banks, and government ownership of banks—vary
across the world and relate these differences to
measures of economic performance and stability. 
While the cross-country approach has much to
teach us, one of the difficulties inherent in such
studies is that many kinds of policy regimes tend to
go together. For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (2002) find that government ownership
of banks tends to occur in countries with substantial
corruption and poor long-run growth performance.
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1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997
Rank Correlation
Correlation of Performance and Asset Growth
NOTE: Plot of the Spearman rank correlation for each year between a bank’s ROE in yeart–1 (normalized relative to
the economy average) and the change in the economywide share of the bank’s assets from yeart–1 to t. Correlations
include only banks that survive for two consecutive years.
Figure 1Similarly, Djankov et al. (2002) find that entry regu-
lations also tend to be most prevalent in countries
with corrupt political institutions. Thus, it becomes
difficult in cross-country studies to determine what
specific factor matters; for example, is entry regula-
tion bad, or does it simply proxy for other sorts of
government constraints that can be overcome only
through bribery?
As noted above, our focus is on the U.S. experi-
ence; the relative homogeneity in the economic and
legal infrastructure across states presents a strong
advantage from an empirical standpoint because
the many “invisible” barriers to effective contracting
and economic performance are either not present
or do not vary substantially across states. Having
said that, the hope of this researcher is that the con-
clusions drawn for the U.S. states will carry over to
other environments, such as emerging economies.
I will focus specifically on three questions. First,
what were the effects of banking reform on states’
growth performance? Second, what were the effects
of reform on entrepreneurial activity? Third, how
did reform affect state-level business cycle stability?
Growth Effects
Joseph Schumpeter (1969) argued in the early
part of the 20th century that efficient financial
systems promote innovations; hence, better finance
leads to faster growth. On the other hand, Joan
Robinson (1952) believed that the causality was
reversed; economies with good growth prospects
develop institutions to provide the funds necessary
to support those good prospects. In other words, the
economy leads and finance follows. Recent theoreti-
cal developments have fleshed out two potential
causal links from financial systems to growth.
Financial markets can matter either by affecting
the volume of savings available to finance invest-
ment or by increasing the productivity (or quality)
of that investment. These theories show that an
improvement in financial market efficiency can act
as a lubricant to the engine of economic growth,
allowing that engine to run faster.
Empirical research in recent years has increas-
ingly provided support for the Schumpterian view
that financial market development can play an
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Market Share of High-ROE Banks: Unit Banking States vs. Longstanding 
Branching States
NOTE: Each line represents the market share of banks with above-median ROE, averaged across each type of state.






Figure 2For example, King and Levine (1993) demonstrated
that the size and depth of an economy’s financial
system is positively correlated with its future growth
in per capita, real income. While this evidence is
appealing, it can not rule out the possibility that
financial development and growth are simultane-
ously driven by a common factor not controlled in
the empirical analysis. Rajan and Zingales (1998)
and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) attempt to answer
this criticism by exploiting cross-industry differences
in financial dependence. They show that in countries
with well-developed financial markets, industries
that require more external finance grow faster than
“cash cow” industries that can finance investment
with internally generated funds.11 Levine, Loayza,
and Beck (2000) attempt to establish a causal link
from finance to growth by using preexisting legal
differences across countries as instruments for the
development of the banking system; they show that
the exogenous component of banking development
is positively related to growth performance.
Another way to establish that better finance
(or, specifically, better banking) can lead to faster
growth is to find policy changes that lead to more
efficient finance (banking) and see how the economy
responds.12 Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003)
do this for equity markets, showing that economic
growth sped up after liberalization. In our earlier
work, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), we study state-
level branching deregulation and find that this
improvement in banking market openness spurred
faster economic growth.13 Using data from 1972 to
1992, we estimated the change in economic perfor-
mance before and after deregulation and found that
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NOTE: Each line represents the market share of banks with above-median ROE, averaged across each type of state.
If there are fewer than 10 states for a particular type in a given year, we do not report the result.
Figure 3
11 Cetorelli (2001, 2003) attempts to gain a better understanding of the
channels through which better finance can affect economic perfor-
mance. He shows that countries with concentrated banking sectors
tend to have more concentrated industrial sectors, particularly in those
sectors where external finance is important. Petersen and Rajan (1995)
find that small U.S. firms in concentrated local banking markets borrow
on better terms than small firms in less-concentrated markets, and
Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2001) find that banking concen-
tration in Italy helps foster creation of new firms.annual growth rates accelerated by 1/2 to 1 percent-
age point. In that study, we worked hard to rule out
other interpretations of the finding. For example,
we showed that states did not deregulate their
economies in anticipation of future good growth
prospects. We also found no other concomitant
policy changes that could account for the result and
no consistent political changes, such as a change
in the party controlling the state government,
around the time of deregulation.
Below, I reestimate this growth model using a
slightly different sample period (1976 to 1996) and
include some additional control variables. Table 3
reports summary statistics for the growth measure,
which equals the real annual growth rate in per
capita state-level personal income.14 The personal
income data are reported by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and converted to constant dollars using
the consumer price index. Over the sample period,
real personal income grew at an annual rate of
slightly less than 1.5 percent. The standard deviation
of the growth rates equals 2.79 percent, with a mini-
mum of about –15 percent (in North Dakota in 1980)
and a maximum of about + 17 percent (again in
North Dakota in 1978). Overall there is clearly more
variability in year-to-year growth rates for small
states such as North Dakota, but in Jayaratne and
Strahan (1996) we were careful to rule out the pos-
sibility that the growth increases were driven by a
few of these small states. In the interest of brevity, I
will not report these tests here.15
Table 4 reports the results of the growth regres-
sions, which include the two banking reform indi-
cator variables, the state and time fixed effects, and
a set of variables controlling for the share of employ-
ment in each state coming from eight one-digit SIC
industries. These share variables account for the
possibility that different sectors exhibit different
levels of average growth.16
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weighted least-squares model, where the weights were proportional
to state size. In addition, we showed that among the 35 states that
deregulated their branching restrictions after 1972, all but 6 experi-
enced an increase in growth after the regulatory changes. 
16 In the regressions the shares sum to 1, so one of the eight groups
must be omitted. In all regressions, the omitted category is the share
of employment in the government sector. Hence, all of the coefficients
measure the effect of increasing the employment share in the sector
relative to the government sector.
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Summary Statistics for State-Level Characteristics
Mean Standard deviation
Real per capita income growth  0.0144  0.0279  
New incorporations per 1000 people living in the state  2.50  1.41  
Growth in new incorporations per capita  0.0206  0.1093  
Volatility of real per capita growth  0.0126  0.0138  
Volatility of growth in new incorporations  0.0656  0.0732  
Growth in bank capital  0.0897  0.0842  
Share of employment in mining  0.0128  0.0177  
Share of employment in construction  0.0478  0.0146  
Share of employment in manufacturing  0.1946  0.1124  
Share of employment in transportation  0.0549  0.0119  
Share of employment in trade  0.2288  0.0377  
Share of employment in finance  0.0533  0.0131  
Share of employment in services  0.2192  0.0600
NOTE: These statistics are calculated using state-year observations. All data except bank capital growth are from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. Bank capital growth equals the change in all capital at banks headquartered in a
given state-year (from the Reports of Income and Condition).
Table 3
14 Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) also considered the growth in gross
state product, which treats income from capital in a slightly different
way from the personal income series. The results, however, were very
similar across these two dependent variables.The results in column 1 suggest that average
growth accelerated by about 0.56 percentage points
following branching reform; following interstate
banking reform the point estimate is only slightly
lower (0.48 percentage points), but it loses statistical
significance.17 In columns 2 and 4 of Table 4, I test
whether these growth effects reflect either a tempo-
rary growth surge just after deregulation or a tempo-
rary growth recession just before deregulation. In
these specifications, I add two additional indicator
variables; the first equals 1 starting five years after
branching reform, and the second equals 1 during
the five-year period leading up to branching reform.
The first additional indicator allows us to test whether
the growth increases were temporary, since this
additional indicator would have a negative and statis-
tically significant coefficient under this hypothesis.
(The long-run effect is estimated by summing the
two coefficients.) Since this additional variable does
not enter the regression with a significant effect,
the evidence suggests that the growth effects are
permanent. Of course, the amount of time that has
elapsed since the end of the deregulatory phase has
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Panel Regression of State Growth in Real, Per Capita Income on Banking Deregulation and
Employment Share Variables
Dependent variable: growth in real per capita state income
Post-branching 0.0056* 0.0051* 0.0068* 0.0066*
(0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Indicator for 5+ years after branching  — –0.0029 — 0.0007
(0.0025) (0.0025)
Indicator for 5 years leading up to branching  — –0.0016 — –0.0001
(0.0026) (0.0027)
Post-interstate banking  0.0048 0.0049 0.0015 0.0014
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Share of employment in mining  — — 0.40* 0.40*
(0.13) (0.13)
Share of employment in construction  — — 0.48* 0.48* 
(0.10) (0.10) 
Share of employment in manufacturing  — — 0.33* 0.33* 
(0.10) (0.10) 
Share of employment in transportation  — — 0.63 0.63*
(0.29) (0.29) 
Share of employment in trade  — — 0.04 0.04
(0.15) (0.15)  
Share of employment in finance  — — –0.88* –0.88*  
(0.29) (0.29)
Share of employment in services  — — 0.15 0.14 
(0.12) (0.12) 
N 949 949 890 890
Within R
2 0.5016 0.5025 0.5485 0.5486
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. These regressions are estimated using a fixed-effects model with both year and state effects.
The year of deregulation is dropped. Also, South Dakota and Delaware are dropped. *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 4
17 Because most states permitted interstate banking during the middle
of the 1980s, there is much less variation to exploit in the regressions
once state and year fixed effects are included. Hence, the standard
error of the interstate banking indicator tends to be larger than the
standard error on the branching reform indicator.not been long—less than ten years in this data set—
so these conclusions must be made cautiously.
Freeman (2002) suggests that states deregulated
their restrictions on branching during periods follow-
ing abnormally low (below trend) economic growth.
He finds that dropping the observations just prior
to deregulation substantially reduces the measured
impact of branching reform on growth. Dropping
these observations, however, reduces the power of
the test by making it harder to pin down the annual
business cycle shocks (the year fixed effects). The
specifications in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4, with
the pre- and post-deregulation indicators, effectively
leave these observations in the sample but allow
the growth rates to vary systematically during the
years surrounding regulatory change. These results
provide very weak evidence that growth was lower
leading up to deregulation; the coefficient equals
–0.16 percent (not statistically significant) in column
2 of Table 4 (and, effectively, 0 in column 4). More-
over, including these indicators does not lead to a
substantively important change in the estimated
growth effect of branching reform. 
In the last two columns of Table 4, I introduce
the employment share variables. These results sug-
gest that mining, construction, manufacturing, and
transportation are associated with relatively faster
growth than the other sectors. Most important for
the purposes here, however, is that the conclusions
remain the same. The effect of branching deregula-
tion gets somewhat larger when the share variables
are added to the model. Moreover, the indicator equal
to 1 during the years starting five years after reform
becomes positive, although as before we cannot
reject the hypothesis that its coefficient equals 0.18
Effects on Entrepreneurs
The results so far suggest that growth acceler-
ated after deregulation. But following the logic of
Rajan and Zingales, just as cash-constrained firms
benefited most from financial development, bank-
dependent firms ought to have benefited the most
from the banking deregulation and associated
improvements in finance. Entrepreneurs or potential
entrepreneurs are likely to be highly dependent on
banks and other financial markets because they have
not had the opportunity (yet) to generate cash flow
that can support investment. Indeed, Schumpeter
(1969) himself emphasized the role of financial
markets in getting funds to young firms as a key
channel through which finance can affect long-run
growth. To test this idea, I now explore how the level
and growth in new business formation changes
following banking reform.19
To measure business formation, I use new
business incorporations in each state and year from
1976 to 1996. This series comes from the individual
states, as reported and compiled by Dun & Bradstreet.
Business incorporations is not a perfect measure of
the rate of business formation in a state, but it offers
the best proxy available that is compiled on a con-
sistent basis over a relatively long period. Dun &
Bradstreet also report a series on business “starts”
that is an offshoot of their credit database. Since
this series goes back only to 1985, it is not helpful
in exploring how the changes in banking that began
in the mid-1970s affected entrepreneurship and
business formation.20 Nevertheless, the starts data
can help verify that business incorporations closely
tracks the rate of business formation in a state. It
turns out that new incorporations per capita and
business starts per capita are consistently positively
correlated with each other; the cross-state correla-
tion ranged from a low of 0.58 in 1994 to a high of
0.72 in 1988. There is one important exception,
however. The number of incorporations in Delaware
is about 20 times the average number of incorpora-
tions in the other states (per capita), while the num-
ber of starts in Delaware is very close to the average.
This difference reflects favorable legal treatment of
incorporations in that state. In addition, measures
of banking structure in both Delaware and South
Dakota are skewed by the presence of credit card
banks in those states. We therefore drop both of
these states from all of our regressions.
As a further check on the data, incorporations
per capita and starts per capita can be compared
with the number of new establishments per capita,
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19 In Black and Strahan (2002), we explore how differences in banking
structure across states affect new business formation.
20 Moreover, the starts series depends on a firm’s actively seeking to raise
funds, because it is based on Dun & Bradstreet’s credit database.
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18 A quick look at Table 1 suggests that the timing of state deregulation
was clustered by region. Thus, one concern with the growth accelera-
tion may be that it is picking up a regional business cycle effect, rather
than an increase in growth that can be tied to state-level branching
reform. To rule out this possibility, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)
introduce four sets of year indicators, one for each of four broad
regions, to control for potential regional business cycles. Introducing
these additional controls reduces the growth acceleration by about
one third (i.e., the coefficient on the branching deregulation indicator),
but it remains statistically significant at the 5 percent level.which is available from the Small Business Adminis-
tration starting in 1989.21 An establishment is not
a firm; rather, it is an economic unit such as a plant,
a factory, or a restaurant that employs people. Never-
theless, we think that the number of new estab-
lishments ought to be highly correlated with the
economic quantity that we are trying to observe—
the rate of creation of new businesses. Again, it is
highly correlated with both incorporations and starts.
From 1989 to 1994, the cross-state correlation
between incorporations and new establishments
ranges from 0.52 to 0.57, and cross-state correla-
tion between starts and new establishments ranges
from 0.41 to 0.65. Thus, new incorporations in a
state seems to be a good proxy for new business
formation.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for both the
level of new incorporations per capita and its annual
growth rate. In a typical state and year, there are
about 2.5 new incorporations formed for every
1000 people living in a state. The mean growth rate
is 2.06 percent per year, slightly higher than the
growth in real per capita income. Notice that the
variation in the growth of new incorporations is
about four times higher than the variation of over-
all income.
Using the new incorporations data, Table 5
reports how entrepreneurial activity changed follow-
ing banking deregulation. (Note that in the levels
regression, I use the logarithm of the rate of new
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Panel Regression of the Level and Growth in New Incorporations on Banking Deregulation
and Employment Share Variables
Log of new  Growth of new
incorporations per capita incorporations per capita
Post-branching 0.0279 0.0981* 0.0312* 0.0390*
(0.0186) (0.0175) (0.0128) (0.0138)
Post-interstate banking  0.1169* 0.0572* –0.0057 –0.0133
(0.0243) (0.0229) (0.0164)  (0.0178)
Share of employment in mining  — 6.30* — 0.75
(0.92) (0.75)
Share of employment in construction  — 9.59* — 0.42
(0.70) (0.63) 
Share of employment in manufacturing  — 2.89* — 0.52 
(0.69) (0.57) 
Share of employment in transportation  — 6.00* — 1.41
(1.99) (1.59) 
Share of employment in trade  — 6.11* — 0.09
(1.03) (0.83)
Share of employment in finance  — 6.04* — –2.87*  
(1.98) (1.58)
Share of employment in services  — 2.68* — –0.64
(0.82) (0.67) 
N 949 890 901 850
Within R
2 0.3554 0.5166 0.1933 0.2259
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. These regressions are estimated using a fixed-effects model with both year and state effects.
The year of deregulation is dropped. Also, South Dakota and Delaware are dropped. *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 5
21 Again, since the new establishments series goes back only to 1989, it
is not useful in exploring the effects of banking deregulation, which
was nearing completion by this time.businesses per capita so that the coefficient may
be interpreted in percentage terms.) Consistent with
the Schumpterian logic, both the level and growth
of entrepreneurial activity increased following
banking deregulation. The regression coefficients
suggest, for example, that the annual level of new
incorporations per capita increased by 9.8 percent
after branching deregulation and by 5.7 percent
after interstate banking reform (column 2). In the
specifications using the growth rate, the increase
occurred only after branching deregulation. Thus,
the effects on entrepreneurial activity of
branching deregulation appear to be larger and
more persistent than the effects of interstate bank-
ing, consistent with the effects of the two reforms
on personal income growth. It is also worth noting
that the magnitude of the increase in the growth of
new incorporations is substantially larger than the
increase in personal income growth following
reform, although the standard errors are also sub-
stantially larger due to the greater variation in this
series.
Business Cycle Effects
The evidence so far points to substantial benefits
of opening up banking markets to potential entry
and greater competition. Entrepreneurs appear
better able to start businesses and, perhaps through
their efforts, economic growth accelerates. Cross-
country evidence that is beginning to emerge sug-
gests that opening up financial markets to foreign
entry can also create benefits associated with macro-
economic stability (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2002).
There is some evidence from studies at the bank
level, however, that risk-taking may increase with
the reductions in franchise value that come follow-
ing banking deregulation (Keeley, 1990; Demsetz,
Saidenberg, and Strahan, 1996; Hellman, Murdock,
and Stiglitz, 2000; Bergstresser, 2001).
How did banking reform in the U.S. affect macro-
economic stability? In a recent paper, Morgan, Rime,
and Strahan (2002) analyze this question from both
a theoretical and an empirical standpoint. They show
first that following interstate banking deregulation
in the United States, the banking system became
substantially better integrated nationally. Prior to
deregulation, the U.S. had a balkanized system com-
posed effectively of 50 little banking systems, one
for each state. After interstate deregulation, however,
an average of about 60 percent of a state’s banking
assets were owned by a multi-state (or sometimes
multinational) banking company. The theoretical
effect of this banking integration on business cycles,
however, is ambiguous. Morgan, Rime, and Strahan
start with a banking model in which bankers can
prevent moral hazard—by monitoring firms—as
well as commit moral hazard—by neglecting to
monitor. These hazards make the equilibrium rate
of investment in the economy depend on the level
of firm collateral and bank capital; these state vari-
ables give firms and bankers a stake in future invest-
ment outcomes, but shocks to either variable cause
equilibrium investment to fall, i.e., collateral crunches
and bank capital crunches are both contractionary. 
Morgan, Rime, and Strahan then show how
integration of banking—that is, linking up the bank-
ing systems of two formerly separate economies—
changes the effects of these two kinds of shocks.
They show that both collateral and capital shocks
remain contractionary after integration, but their
magnitudes change: Bank capital shocks become
less important after integration, but the effect of
collateral shocks gets bigger. The intuition for this
result is straightforward and general. A banking
company that is diversified across two economies
can import capital if lending opportunities in one
economy are strong relative to the availability of
local bank capital. In contrast, a collateral shock in
one economy will lead the integrated bank to export
their capital and lending, thus worsening the result-
ing downturn.
Table 6 quantifies empirically how both branch-
ing and interstate banking deregulation affected
the magnitude of state business cycles. The depen-
dent variable in these regressions equals the absolute
value of the residuals from the personal income
growth regressions (Table 4, columns 1 and 3) and
the growth in new incorporations regressions (Table
5, columns 3 and 4). Thus, the dependent variables
in Table 6 can be thought of as the magnitude of the
deviation from expected growth in state personal
income and new businesses, conditional on the
employment shares in a state, the state’s average
growth rate (the state fixed effect), and shocks to
the U.S. economy as a whole (the year fixed effects).
The results suggest that overall state-level
business cycle volatility fell after interstate banking
and the associated financial integration. The coef-
ficients suggest a decline of 0.31 to 0.47 percentage
points, which is large relative to the unconditional
mean of 1.26 percent (columns 1 and 2). The effects
of branching deregulation are not significant, al-
though this should perhaps not be too surprising
because branching deregulation allowed integration
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Strahan R EVIEWwithin a state rather than across state lines.22 The
results for the volatility of the growth of new incor-
porations also point in the same direction—toward
less volatility following deregulation—although the
coefficients on both deregulation indicators are not
significant at conventional levels (columns 3 and 4).
The theoretical analysis suggests that the expla-
nation for better macroeconomic stability following
deregulation is due to better insulation of a state’s
economy against shocks to its own banking system.
In a disintegrated banking system, such as the one
we had in the 1970s and early 1980s, shocks to
bank capital lead to reductions in lending, thereby
worsening the downturn. In contrast, with integra-
tion a state can import bank capital from abroad
(i.e., from other states) when its banks are down. If
this explanation really holds, then the correlation
between economic performance and banking per-
formance ought to weaken with deregulation and
integration.
Table 7 puts this notion to the test by adding
the growth rate of local bank capital to the personal
income and incorporations growth regressions
reported in Tables 4 and 5, along with interactions
between bank capital growth and the deregulation
indicator variables. The results provide strong sup-
port for the idea that interstate banking deregulation
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22 Perhaps a better test of the potential stabilizing effects of branching
reform would be to use local economic performance, such as from a
county or city. Integration of banks within a state might help localities
share risks just as integration across state lines help states share risks.
Panel Regression of Volatility of Growth in Real, Per Capita Income and New Incorporations
on Banking Deregulation and Employment Share Variables
Volatility in growth in real,  Volatility in growth in new 
per capita state income incorporations per capita
Post-branching –0.0001 –0.0004 –0.0136 –0.0090
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0080) (0.0088)
Post-interstate banking  –0.0031* –0.0047* –0.0072 –0.0116
(0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0107)  (0.0114)
Share of employment in mining  — 0.01 — 1.86*
(0.08) (0.48)
Share of employment in construction  — 0.20* — 0.25
(0.06) (0.41) 
Share of employment in manufacturing  — –0.01 — 0.24 
(0.06) (0.36) 
Share of employment in transportation  — 0.02 — –2.24*
(0.17) (1.02) 
Share of employment in trade  — 0.08 — 0.27
(0.09) (0.53)
Share of employment in finance  — 0.20 — 1.35  
(0.17) (1.01)
Share of employment in services  — 0.07 — 0.31
(0.07) (0.43) 
N 949 890 901 850
Within R
2 0.0650 0.0932 0.0604 0.0987
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. The volatility equals the absolute deviation in the growth rate from its expected value—that is,
the absolute value of the residuals from the models reported in Tables 4 and 5. These regressions are estimated using a fixed-effects
model with both year and state effects. The year of deregulation is dropped. Also, South Dakota and Delaware are dropped.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 6severed the link between local economic perfor-
mance and local bank performance.23 According to
the estimated coefficients, a 10-percentage-point
reduction in the growth of bank capital held by local
banks would be associated with a decline in personal
income growth of 1.2 to 1.4 percent prior to inter-
state banking reform. After reform, however, this
correlation becomes indistinguishable (statistically)
from 0 (columns 1 and 2).
Table 7 also shows that the link between local
bank capital and the growth of new incorporations
is much stronger prior to deregulation, compared
with its link with overall income growth, consistent
with the premise that banks are especially important
for small and young firms. The regression coeffi-
cients, for instance, suggest that a 10-percentage-
point reduction in the growth of local bank capital
would be associated with a decline in the growth
rate of new incorporations of 4.5 to 5.4 percent,
again prior to interstate banking reform. After reform,
however, this correlation also becomes indistinguish-
able (statistically) from 0 (columns 3 and 4). So,
integration has salutary effects on business cycles
by insulating the local economy from the ups and
downs of the local banking system. Of course, the
kind of cross-state integration that we experienced
following interstate deregulation would not be
expected to insulate states from shocks to all banks
in the United States.
CONCLUSIONS
Banking deregulation of restrictions on branch-
ing and interstate banking lifted a set of constraints
that had prevented better-run banks from gaining
ground over their less-efficient rivals. Big changes
in the banking industry followed deregulation: many
acquisitions and consolidations, integration across
state lines, and a decline in the market share of
small banks. These changes allowed banks to offer
better services to their customers at lower prices.
As a result, the real economy—“Main Street” as it
were—seems to have benefited. Overall economic
growth accelerated following deregulation, and this
faster growth seems to have been concentrated
among new businesses. Sometimes we think that
higher returns necessarily come at the cost of greater
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Panel Regression of Growth Variables on Banking Deregulation, Bank Capital Growth, and
Employment Share Variables
Growth in real,  Growth in new 
per capita state income incorporations per capita
Post-branching 0.0028 0.0031 0.0238 0.0292
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0202) (0.0203)
Post-interstate banking  0.0099* 0.0094* 0.0189 0.0244
(0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0217)  (0.0226)
Growth in local bank capital 0.1416* 0.1244* 0.4535* 0.5388*
(0.0234) (0.0268) (0.1286)  (0.1431)
Growth in local bank capital × 0.0226 0.0322 0.1086 0.1028
post-branching (0.0330) (0.0348) (0.1852)  (0.1886)
Growth in local bank capital × –0.1267* –0.1266* –0.4794* –0.5840*
post-interstate banking (0.0312)  (0.0341)  (0.1770)  (0.1831)
Employment share variables included? No Yes No Yes
N 851 794 803 754
Within R
2 0.5533 0.5881 0.2293 0.2762
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. These regressions are estimated using a fixed-effects model with both year and state effects.
The year of deregulation is dropped. Also, South Dakota and Delaware are dropped. *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
The sample ends in 1994 because the capital growth variable cannot be constructed at the state level accurately after that time.
Table 7
23 Local banks here means banks headquartered within the state.risk, but in the case of U.S. banking deregulation,
volatility of the economy declined as growth went up. 
Will these beneficial results on both mean
economic growth and business cycle volatility trans-
late over to small economies opening their financial
markets? Using a broad panel of countries, Morgan
and Strahan (2002) report evidence that foreign
bank entry seemed to be followed by more—or
certainly no less—economic volatility. But these
conclusions are made tentatively; more research is
clearly needed. Given the strong statistical results
reported here for the United States, it would seem
that additional country “case studies” would be
particularly valuable.
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